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Our people are decided in the opinion that it is necessary
for us to take a share in the occupation of the ocean . . .
but what will be the consequence? Frequent wars without a doubt.
— Thomas Jefferson.
That which is good for communities in America is good for the
Armenians and Greeks and Mohammedans of Turkey.
— American Board of Foreign Missions, 1881
If we have to use force it is because we are America. We are the
indispensable nation.
 — Madeleine Albright
Much ink is expended these days to account for what many believe is a newthrust in the American experience; namely, that the present administration has
embarked upon a course of “empire” quite in opposition to the main contours of
American history. For many, the ascendance of the United States to global domi-
nance is accidental or serendipitous, quite in contrast to the calculated Machiavellian
ascensions of great powers in the past.1
War IS
the American
Way of Life
Paul L. Atwood
The war against terror following the September 11 attack is in keeping with the
long history of American foreign policy. Various “doctrines” issued by one
president after another since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 are really incremen-
tal expansions of that original statement of hemispheric dominance aimed at
encompassing the entire globe. The westward expansion to the Pacific coast and
beyond to the Philippines, Hawaii, and the interventions in the nations of Latin
America are early stages in the development of American hegemony. After inter-
vening in the First World War, Wilson tried to dictate the peace. The rest of the
century found a massive build up in military strength with concomitant bellicos-
ity. Setting themselves against a more recent history of global cooperation, key
ideologues within the Bush Administration have used the tragic events of 9/11
to set in motion a comprehensive plan for the United States to act unilaterally,
without respect for international institutions like the United Nations, to achieve
“full spectrum dominance,” that is, total control in all areas, political, eco-
nomic, and military across the globe.
Paul Atwood is a faculty member in American Studies and research associate in the William
Joiner Center for the Study of War and Social Consequences, University of Massachusetts
Boston.
New England Journal of Public Policy
180
This is simply factually wrong. The founders of this nation rebelled against Brit-
ain in order to reap the benefits of British empire-building in North America them-
selves and in short order organized the nascent United States to compete directly
with London for dominance in the western hemisphere. What Jefferson called an
“empire for liberty” required the loss of liberty for peoples other than privileged
Americans. Since the founding, by means of a number of serial changes in “doc-
trine,” the United States has progressively enlarged the scope of its dominance,
extending it literally to the world.
If one were able to step back in time to the beginning of the twentieth century,
one would find a very different America. A tiny oligarchy made up largely of
ruthless and fantastically wealthy kleptocrats and their political representatives
dominated the rapidly expanding industrial order (just as today); a small but grow-
ing middle class was just converting to the new religion of consumerism; the farm
population was declining rapidly, and a large mass of overworked, impoverished,
slum dwelling and unhealthy Americans were stirring in riotous demand of a fairer
share of the burgeoning economy.
The patrician oligarchy feared that the “great unwashed” might actually succeed
in overturning the established order and so, over the next few decades they stage-
managed a “progressive” solution to the nation’s woes. Demands for shorter hours,
safer working conditions, better pay and housing, and healthcare had come from the
lower orders, but the conservative intelligentsia of the day understood that some of
these demands would have to be met. The crux of the matter was how to do so with-
out detriment to the elite’s own political and economic interests.2
The answer, in short, was that the United States should leap onto the stage of
global empire, in competition for other people’s resources with Europe’s powers,
and establish markets for American products by force. In this way radical redistribu-
tion of the local American economic pie could be averted simply by creating a much
larger pie. The oligarchs could retain the bulk of the economic power that accrued
to them from ownership, and simultaneously make the lives of ordinary working
citizens easier, thereby reducing the pressure for more holistic change.
The problem, though we have never really faced it honestly, is that impoverished
Americans who had recently been viciously exploited by their American overlords
now became, though in a virtually invisible, globally systemic way, the beneficiaries
of exploitation themselves.
To shield ourselves from comprehending this we have invented a rigorous ideol-
ogy that informs us that we have created the most prosperous society in history by
virtue of our own industry, creative genius, exceptional history and national charac-
ter, and system of free enterprise. Thus those who remain “undeveloped,” do not
prosper, it is assumed, are mired in poverty because they are lazy or uneducated,
lack drive, ambition and a work ethic, or are otherwise benighted. Yet the reality is
radically different.  A student of mine from Mali put matters most starkly once by
declaring to a class, “We have been plundered for five centuries. With what are we
to develop? Your development has required our systematic underdevelopment.”
At the dawn of the twentieth century, as the Progressive spirit of the age waxed,
faith in progress was virtually universal throughout the West, embracing the certi-
tude that humanity was evolving beyond its primitive, violent past and that the
institutions of western civilization — liberalism and capitalism especially — were
leading the way and creating the preconditions for future peace and prosperity across
the globe. The savagery and carnage of World War I erased such naivete, making
way for nihilism or a thirst for vengeance, thus planting the seeds of another round
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of global warfare that resulted in tens of millions of deaths, incalculable suffering,
and destruction of resources on a gargantuan scale.
Since 1945, despite the establishment of the United Nations with its avowed
intent to prevent war, the number of humans dead at the hands of their fellows in
armed conventional conflicts around the earth approaches the number killed in
World War II. The conventional weapons trade sustains many national economies
while weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological, and
chemical, have proliferated. If ever unleashed in another global war they will surely
extinguish civilization as we know it, if not humanity itself. Few would dispute that
far from fulfilling the optimistic predictions, the twentieth century was the bloodiest
in human history. The dismal chronicle of the recent era ought to raise exceedingly
serious questions — and anxieties — about the twenty-first century to come.
Any serious speculation about the prospects for war or peace in the new century
must confront the history and policies of the most potent armed entity ever to
bestride the planet. As we enter this new epoch American land, air, and sea forces
(and bases to support them) are dispersed across the globe in a projection of power
by one nation on a scale unimaginable at the dawn of the twentieth  century.
Today the United States is at war in two nations and is actively intervening in
many more. American arms patrol all the seas and skies, including outer space.
Troops are stationed in force throughout the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central
and Southeast Asia where they disturb second-tier powers, Russia and China, and
they remain in significant numbers in Europe, Japan, and Korea. In the Western
hemisphere, American troops have covertly entered a longstanding civil war in
Colombia, while U.S. military liaisons with Latin American militaries are intimate
except with Cuba’s. With the Pentagon asserting its intention to achieve “full-
spectrum dominance,” the Bush administration announced its desire to proceed with
a resuscitated missile defense program, repudiated the 1972 ABM Treaty, and
impeded the ratification of the global landmine treaty. Bush’s announced intention to
develop new generations of nuclear weapons, even as he demands that other nations
must desist from such development, will actually spur their proliferation, and a new
arms race with at minimum, both the Russians and Chinese. Meanwhile, second-and
third-tier powers will scramble to acquire their own WMD, as Israel, India, Paki-
stan, North Korea, and perhaps Iran, have already done.
Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, as well as the coterie of
neo-conservatives surrounding President Bush, unhesitatingly embrace the term
“hegemony” as the U.S. goal for the twenty-first century.3 Thus, the decisions of the
wealthiest and most powerful nation on earth, as it reacts to events, are certain to
shape matters of war and peace as the new millennium unfolds.
But there is nothing new in all this except today’s global scale. The original thir-
teen colonies of the U.S. owed their existence to armed violence and their prosperity
to race-based slavery, indentured servitude, and ethnic cleansing. Thus the U.S. was
conceived and birthed in considerable bloodshed. When the rebellious leaders of the
nascent United States made their momentous decision to break from British author-
ity, their primary goal was to replace Britain as the dominant power in North
America, including an attempt to annex Canada. U.S. territorial expansion from
1789 to 1854 — from sea to shining sea — was the most rapid and extensive in
human history. It was carried out by armed violence with genocidal results.
As early as 1823 the United States announced the Monroe Doctrine and its greater
goal of hemispheric jurisdiction, though it as yet lacked the firepower to enforce
such an aim. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the prevailing American
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ideology of Manifest Destiny emphasized “continentalism” or the right of the United
States to dominate the North American land mass. Meanwhile the United States was
actively intervening in Central America, enlarging its dominion by forcibly annex-
ing approximately one-third of Mexico, and laying the groundwork for a canal to
connect the Atlantic and Pacific.
Having wrested the ports of California from Mexico and the Pacific Northwest
from Britain, Washington signaled its desire to contest for sovereignty in the Pacific,
embarking on a fateful armed encounter with Japan, invoking the threat of force,
and thereby setting in motion events that would ultimately reap the bitter harvest of
war in the following century.
The Civil War put foreign policy objectives on hold, but once national unity had
been settled, the global industrial and financial  preponderance of the United States
was attained by 1900. Shortly thereafter Teddy Roosevelt announced his famous
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: the United States would henceforth “police” the
Western Hemisphere. Since then, through various mutations, the doctrine has been,
in effect, extended to the entire world.
As Jefferson predicted, America’s growing ascendancy in the world markets re-
quired greater armed forces and a more active, interventionist and violent stance in
global affairs in order to ensure that resources in other people’s lands arrived on
American shores on American terms and that their commodity, capital, and labor
markets served American corporate interests.
As early as 1853 Senator William Seward, later the aggrandizing Secretary of
State who purchased Alaska from Russia, spoke to the growing aims of U.S. foreign
policy:
Multiply your ships and send them forth to the East. The nation that draws most materi-
als and provisions from the earth, and fabricates the most, and sells the most of produc-
tions and fabrics to foreign nations, must be, and will be, the great power of the earth. 4
Later, after the Civil War he added:
          The world contains no seat of empire so magnificent as this . . . the nation thus situated . . .
             must command the empire of the seas, which alone is real empire. 5
    By 1895 the U.S. had seized much of Samoa,  prompting Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge to exult  as follows:
We have a record of conquest, colonization and expansion unequalled by any people in
the 19th century . . . we are not to be curbed now. For the sake of our commercial pros-
perity we ought to seize the Hawaiian Islands now.6
Lodge’s challenge was quickly taken up; Hawaii was annexed in 1898.
That year the United States would actively seek war with Spain, stating officially
that Spain constituted a threat to the hemisphere, and that the goals were to banish
the corrupt and brutal Spanish and promote freedom for their colonized peoples in
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. But there were those in and about the
McKinley Administration with ulterior motives. As Theodore Roosevelt, then
undersecretary of the navy, put matters:
I should say that I would welcome a foreign war. It is very difficult for me not to wish
war with Spain for that would result at once in getting a proper navy. . . . In strict confi-
dence I should welcome almost any war.” 7
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TR’s strategic desires followed from an emerging central doctrine in foreign
policy circles. Like most members of the era’s political/economic elite he empha-
sized the protection of export markets as central to American domestic stability. The
American economic engine was creating surplus products far in excess of the domes-
tic market’s capacity to absorb them. The solution to this problem seemed clear:
open new markets. The war with Spain would give the United States bases in the
Philippines, the doorstep to the East, and in the Caribbean to make those waters
America’s mare nostrum. Even Roosevelt’s political opponents agreed. As Mark
Hanna put matters:
We can and will take a large slice of the commerce of Asia. That is what we want. We
are bound to share in the commerce of the Far East, and it is better to strike for it while
the iron is hot.8
It is often forgotten that TR was a Harvard-trained historian whose written works
were fundamentalist panegyrics to American/Anglo-Saxon supremacy and expan-
sionism.9 He was at the heart of a coterie of intellectuals within power circles who
saw him as their “man on horseback.” Together, they formulated strategic, eco-
nomic, and ideological justifications for renewed American expansion in the late
nineteenth century, and these bear significant comparison to related ideas promoted
by the ideologues in power today.
Perhaps the rawest, most honest expression of the group’s objectives, was made
by a political ally of the Roosevelt circle, Senator Albert Beveridge. Speaking of the
brutal Philippine War of 1900–02 he uttered the following on the Senate
floor:
God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand
years for nothing but vain and idle self- admiration. No, he has made us the master
organizers of the world . . . that we may administer government among savages and
senile peoples. . . . The Philippines are ours forever . . . and just beyond the Philippines
lie China’s illimitable markets. . . . We will not renounce our part in the mission of our
race, trustee under God, of the civilization of the world. . . . China is our natural cus-
tomer. The Philippines give us a base at the door of the East. . . . It has been charged that
our conduct of the war has been cruel. Senators, it has been the reverse. Senators,
remember that we are not dealing with Americans or Europeans. We are dealing with
Orientals.10
This remarkable statement encapsulates the prevailing doctrines then gaining
currency in American civic ideology and which would characterize the American
mind-set to one degree or other until the war in Vietnam of the 1960s occasioned a
public (and from the perspective of power, dangerous) and short-lived rethinking of
the nation’s sense of purpose.
First, there is the renascent idea of Manifest Destiny in which God is presumed to
have ordained a special mission for America as the inheritor of Anglo-Saxon civili-
zation to set the agenda for the world. Second, the emphasis on American commer-
cial interests in China (greater East Asia) that will require military and naval bases
to protect them. Finally, there is Social-Darwinism and its embedded racism insist-
ing on Anglo-American racial superiority and justifying mass killing of Filipino
civilians as racial inferiors standing in the way of “progress.”
Years later the slaughter of Filipinos by Japanese troops would serve as one
among many justifications for the war with Japan. By then, atrocities committed by
Americans in the all but forgotten Philippine War would be erased from the history
we teach our children.
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The rise of the United States to industrial and financial power had occasioned
profound social, political, and economic dislocations in the latter nineteenth century,
which, in turn, prompted critical rethinking by older elites as to how to conserve
their power, and how to gain power for would-be corporate arrivistes. New difficul-
ties presented themselves: labor strife, urbanization, and the influx of southern and
eastern European immigrants with different political ideologies.  Most important,
domestic consumption could not absorb the surplus created by American productiv-
ity, a factor that led inexorably to mass unemployment.
As the U.S. domestic population grew, pressure rose from below for redistribu-
tion of the nation’s vast wealth, taking the form of demands for higher wages,
shorter working weeks, the abolition of child labor, and health and safety guaran-
tees. This critical welter of problems induced a flowering of ideas and theories from
across the social and political spectrum. Rather than undergoing a radical redistribu-
tion of wealth, the nation’s elites determined to enlarge the United States’ share of
global markets.
Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier thesis provided one rationale for expansion
beyond U.S. continental borders. In the midst of the worst economic depression to
have struck the United States (1893–97), Turner argued that the western frontier had
long served as a safety valve to reduce popular social and political discontent by
allowing migration to new lands, and he stressed that the final closing of that fron-
tier (1890) required new outlets for American energies, a “commercial frontier”
across the Pacific.11
This argument flowed naturally into the theories being put forth by Brooks and
Henry Adams, scions of the presidential family, who argued that the decay of
American civilization was at hand unless the course of empire continued its west-
ward trajectory. Brooks believed he had found the key to history in the westward
progress of “world civilization” from ancient Greece and Rome to Britain and the
United States. To avoid historically inevitable decay, the United States must con-
tinue this movement on into the Pacific. According to Adams, only the “valor” of
the American soldier could protect against the “law of civilization and decay.” 12
Inevitably such ideas percolated in military strategic circles as well. In his classic,
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Captain (later Admiral)
Alfred Thayer Mahan rooted his prescriptions for the expansion of the American
navy in response to the economic dislocations then widespread. The expansion of
industry had caused the United States to grow out of its domestic market. New out-
lets for the consumption of American production, and new sources of raw materials,
would have to be found. Colonial possessions, which might provide bases for battle-
ships, would serve as the necessary stepping-stones to the markets of Latin America
and Asia. Such colonies existed, ready-made for the taking, in Cuba, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines. A canal through the Panamanian isthmus would provide the
strategic link for American naval domination of the Atlantic and Pacific.13
Social Darwinism was the perfect fertilizer as these ideas took root. Arising pre-
cisely at the moment when industrialization was radically altering western society
and leading economic thinkers to advocate imperial expansion, Social Darwinism
sought to extend Darwin’s new theories about the struggle for life in the biological
sphere to human society on a global scale and contributed to the idea that the Anglo-
Saxon or Germanic “races” were inherently superior. We are accustomed to believe
that Nazi ideology provided the provenance of such notions. But consider the state-
ment made by General Arthur MacArthur, father of General Douglas MacArthur,
and first governor-general of the occupied Philippines: “America’s wonderful thrust
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into Asia was the destiny of the magnificent Aryan people.”14
All of these theories, rooted seemingly in the objective facts of history, pro-
pounded by pedigreed scholars, seemed as siren songs to Roosevelt, Cabot Lodge,
Secretary of State John Hay, and others anxious to project the United States into the
club of great powers.
Hay is remembered chiefly for articulating the Open Door Policy that envisioned
free access to the markets of greater East Asia to all western powers and Japan. On
the surface, the policy seemed to be fair and equitable. By this time, however, the
productive capacity of the United States exceeded most of its rivals combined, and
Wall Street was steadily undermining Britain’s financial supremacy. The ability of
the United States to out-compete the other great powers economically meant effec-
tively a closed door for them in China and they knew it. That is why all opposed the
Open Door, especially Japan, a rising Pacific power that had emerged suddenly,
fearful that western imperialists who had already subjected much of Asia to their
rule would set their sights on Nippon. Like Germany, Japan burst upon the interna-
tional scene in the late nineteenth century, throwing the world system into disarray.
Japan’s emergence as a military power capable of thwarting western goals in East
Asia stemmed from Commodore Perry’s armed incursion in the 1850s, an epochal
event that so frightened the Japanese shoguns that they set aside their differences in
order to strengthen the imperial throne. Subsequently, Japan underwent rapid mod-
ernization. A feudal power in 1855 at roughly the stage of development of
thirteenth-century England, Japan had achieved near parity with western powers by
1905 after its stunning defeats of China in 1895 and Russia in 1904. Thus,
Washington’s Open Door in Asia faced no greater challenge. Even before the turn of
the century, the American navy was drawing up plans to war with Japan, plans that
would be refined right up to 1941.15
China itself showed signs of rejecting western designs. In 1900, the Boxer Rebel-
lion broke out among students enraged over western exploitation of China’s weak-
ness. Most European powers, and the United States and Japan, dispatched troops to
quell the anti-foreign riots. This armed “police action” was the cause of profound
resentment toward westerners, which would be an important factor in the success of
the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949.
In the lead-up to World War I the United States exerted its declared hegemony
over the Western Hemisphere, established military and naval bases in Cuba and
Puerto Rico, and launched numerous armed interventions throughout the Caribbean
including Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In
1904 President Teddy Roosevelt dispatched ships and troops to sever the province of
Panama from Colombia, which was demanding more money from Washington for
rights to build a long-sought inter-oceanic canal. Domestic opposition arose to TR’s
executive fiat. Said Teddy: “I took the Panama Canal. Let Congress debate.”16
When the Mexican Revolution threatened American investments (American com-
panies owned or controlled 80 percent of Mexico’s mineral deposits, including oil),
President Wilson declared, “I will teach them to elect good men,” and ordered the
bombardment of Vera Cruz.17
In 1914 the European great powers went to war with each other largely over
whether Germany would emerge as the dominant continental power and threaten the
positions of Britain, France, and Russia. This contest between Europeans brought
American trade and the Open Door into focus for American policymakers. Wilson
declared the United States officially neutral. But his executive order requiring
American businesses to act evenhandedly toward belligerents did not have the full
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force of law. Most American businessmen preferred to trade equally with both sides
in the European war, but the dominant British navy blockaded German ports, effec-
tively halting American trade with the Triple Alliance. Unable to blockade Britain
and France, the Germans began to sink British merchant ships carrying American
goods.
Meanwhile most large American banks were extending credit and loans to the
British and French to cover the costs of their American imports, and the United
States  government was loaning considerable sums to the British Exchequer. Ameri-
can shippers were also violating the neutrality policy by secretly loading contraband
aboard ships bound for Britain.
Since American trade with Germany had vanished, the United States had a vested
interest in the Allied side of the war. Should Britain lose the war it could not repay
its loans or credits. Meanwhile a German victory portended long-term closure of
European markets on terms not amenable to the Open Door policy. Though Wilson’s
official position was to stay out of the war, pressure increased on him to side with
Britain and France. When the Germans sank the British passenger liner Lusitania,
loaded with banned and decidedly un-neutral ammunition in 1915, with the loss of
128 American lives, the slogan “freedom of the seas” became the war cry of Ameri-
can hawks. Though Germany drew back and stopped attacking British ships, it could
not long allow unimpeded British access to American goods. When Germany
resumed submarine warfare in the spring of 1917, the casus belli desired in the most
politically influential U. S. circles had been achieved.
Waged under the slogan “to make the world safe for democracy,” World War I
catapulted the United States to the forefront of power. Very little in the way of de-
mocracy resulted, however. Taking advantage of Germany’s economic collapse after
the war, vengeful Britain and France saw to the occupation of German territory and
saddled their erstwhile enemy with enormous reparations. Feeling humiliated and
embittered, German war veterans formed the nucleus of what would become the
Nazi party.
Russia, meanwhile, devastated by the war, turned to Leninism, and then
descended into civil strife. Hoping to strangle the Bolshevik infant in its cradle,
Britain, France, the United States, and Japan dispatched troops to take the side of
counterrevolutionaries — a fact all but forgotten in the United States but well re-
membered in Russia. This armed intervention in Russia had the effect of tightening
the grip of totalitarianism on that nation. Faced with aggression from outsiders,
control of the Soviet state devolved to the most ruthless of the Bolsheviks vying for
power: Stalin.
Japan, too, resented its treatment after the war. Both the United States and Britain
tried to force it to accept a second-class military status in the hope of averting Japa-
nese expansion into East Asia. Such tactics reaped the reverse. In 1932 Japan
 invaded and annexed Manchuria and for the remainder of the decade progressively
took control of China’s eastern coast and French Indochina. Japan’s announced goal
was a “Monroe Doctrine for Asia,”18 and this came directly into conflict with the
Open Door policy that envisioned untrammeled American access to East Asia’s vast
resources, markets, and labor.
Japan’s attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor has become the legend-
ary paradigm for the “American way of war,” which asserts that the United States
goes to war only when the overt assaults and crimes of others leave no alternative.
Yet the historical record shows clearly that the Roosevelt Administration had under-
taken measures that left Japan with effectively two choices: to accept permanent
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subordinate status in the international arena or to go to war with what Admiral
Isoruko Yamamoto, the architect of the Hawaiian strike, called a “sleeping giant.”
When ordered to plan the attack on Pearl Harbor, he told his superiors that, if suc-
cessful, the surprise attack might buy Japan some time, but that Japan could not win
a long-term war with the United States. The best outcome to be expected would be
the destruction of the threatening American fleet, an opportunity to strengthen de-
fenses around the empire, and a subsequent negotiated settlement.19
We now know that the decryption system known as “Magic,” radio direction find-
ers, and wiretaps on spies in Honolulu provided ample evidence of Japan’s intent to
strike at Pearl Harbor. Indeed “War Plan Orange,” the U.S. naval plan for war with
Japan devised early in the twentieth century, anticipated that Pearl Harbor would be
the key to victory — for either side. Moreover, Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew,
through his system of spies, learned early in 1941 of Japan’s secret plan, and numer-
ous naval officers of the highest rank warned President Franklin Roosevelt that his
measures, including moving the Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii, and the
subsequent oil and steel embargoes, and finally the ultimatum presented to Japan to
quit Indochina in the summer of 1941, were ineluctably leading to war. As FDR
said, “Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United
States and the nation would be willing to enter the war.” 20
American cryptographers had successfully decoded Japanese diplomatic ciphers
allowing Washington to know that Tokyo had decided on a course of war after nego-
tiations had broken down. Thus, on November 27, 1941, a full ten days before Pearl
Harbor, Secretary of War Henry Stimson issued an official “war warning” to all
Pacific commanders: “The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act
. . . undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.” 21
The real issue is why FDR and his cabinet desired war with Japan — and
Germany.
Neither Germany nor Japan, nor both combined, had the remotest chance to
invade the United States and subject it to their rule. Most Americans seemed to ap-
preciate this; on the eve of Pearl Harbor polls showed that 80 percent of the popula-
tion was opposed to entering the war. The recent Battle of Britain had demonstrated
Nazi weakness clearly. If Hitler had failed to cross thirty miles of the English Chan-
nel how could he cross the Atlantic Ocean to attack the continental United States?
 On Wall Street, however, the temperature was very different. The financial elite
perceived serious threats but they were not military in nature. Both Germany and
Japan’s autarkic empires would shut out the free access of American capital and
goods to their markets. As the United States struggled to recover from the Great
Depression, Volkswagens would be sold throughout the Reich, not Chevrolets; mean-
while Japan was simultaneously closing the open door in East Asia.
As Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau put matters: “The Germans will form a
sort of overall trading corporation and what are we to do about our cotton and
wheat?”22 Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long said: “If Germany wins
this war and subordinates Europe every commercial order will be routed to Berlin
and filled under its orders somewhere in Europe rather than in the United States.”23
A major lord of Wall Street, Bernard Baruch spoke for many:
Germany does not have to conquer us in a military sense. By enslaving her own labor
and that of the conquered countries, she can place in the markets of the world products
at a price with which we could not compete. This will destroy our standards of living
and shake to its depths our moral and physical fiber, already strained to the breaking
point. 24
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Baruch’s point was seconded by Thomas Lamont of the First National City Bank:
Under a Hitler victory we should find ourselves in the midst of a country-wide depres-
sion so deep and so prolonged as to make the worst of the last ten years here look like a
happy and bountiful time.25
Fortune magazine editorialized:
With a population of more than 400 million China is the biggest single potential market
in the world. A strong China, able and willing to protect the principle of the open market
in the Far East, would be worth billions of dollars to the United States. 26
The United States entered WWII last and used its naval and air power primarily.
Thus the U.S. suffered the fewest military casualties, and unlike its closest allies as
well as its enemies, endured no combat or devastation on its continental territory.
Indeed, at war’s end the United States was far richer than when it entered, and be-
cause all the other great powers had spent themselves, it emerged as the dominant
power on the planet.
Immediately, however, the specter of mass unemployment surfaced. Even before
the end of the war in 1944, Charles Wilson, former chief of General Electric and
FDR’s wartime production czar, had worried about what to do about sixteen million
GIs returning to civilian life. Would breadlines await them? War production had
ended the Great Depression, but it had absorbed only a fraction of those formerly
unemployed. Most young would-be workers had gone into military service. Wilson’s
answer was a “permanent war economy.”27 But for that a permanent enemy would be
required.
Thus, yesterday’s ally rapidly became the new threat. Though the Soviet Union
had undergone the most extensive devastation in the history of warfare — over
twenty-five million dead, seventy thousand cities and towns utterly destroyed, trans-
portation and agriculture crippled — Americans were bombarded with propaganda
to the effect that Moscow was taking over the world. In fact, communist propaganda
did call for worldwide revolution, but the revolt of the so-called “third world” was
not directed from Moscow. Communist agitation and upheaval in Vietnam and
Korea, and incipient anti-colonial struggles across the planet, were a response to
centuries of European (and Japanese) misrule, and to the post-World War II recogni-
tion that the Europeans were finished as empire builders.
Stalin sought to take advantage of imperial decline more to foster traditional
Russian foreign policy aims, most particularly national security, than to spread the
true faith of communism. While the Red Army occupied eastern and central Europe,
this was a result of having successfully waged war against the Nazi juggernaut. The
Soviets occupied this territory for exactly the same reason that the United States
occupied Western Europe and all of Japan.
Though the Yalta Accords at the end of World War II had effectively assented to a
division of Europe in keeping with military realities, Washington, employing
Churchill’s phrase, began to assert that Stalin had drawn an “Iron Curtain” across
Europe, and that he had to be “contained.” As soon as the dust of WWII had settled,
the mass media began to assault the public with doomsday scenarios of Soviet
launched nuclear missiles falling on Washington, even though the United States was
the sole atomic power, and most intelligence studies insisted that Stalin was almost
ten years away from acquiring nukes.28
The notion that it was moral opposition to communist totalitarianism that ani-
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mated American policy is widely held, but that idea is contravened by the fact that
throughout the Cold War, Washington overthrew democracies and filled the vacuums
with brutal dictatorships every bit as criminal as anything to be found in the com-
munist world. And Stalin’s presumed intransigence is called into question by the
facts that he withdrew Soviet troops from Iran, Manchuria, North Korea, and Aus-
tria in line with wartime agreements, hardly the actions of someone bent on global
domination. Rather Stalin’s power, while great, was still limited by the vastly supe-
rior power of the United States as the history of containment proved, and his actions
were those of a ruler cannily, if savagely, preserving what he possessed.
Clearly, the Soviets attempted to exploit popular revolutions wherever they could.
But Washington was also intervening across the planet and on a much greater scale.
The wars in Korea and Vietnam were not orchestrated in Moscow or Beijing, and the
aid given to U.S. client regimes in Seoul and Saigon dwarfed the contributions of
the so-called communist monolith.
The deeper crisis facing American supremacy was the devastation of the global
capitalist economy engendered by the war. U.S. policy faced a four-pronged threat:
that the ruined nations of capitalist Europe — both friend and former foe — would
revert to the sort of economic nationalism of the prewar years; or that postwar im-
poverishment would gain support for socialists and communists and that might lead
to accommodation with the Soviets, that both Europe and the Asian rim could not
buy American goods owing to their lack of dollars; and finally that the European
colonies were in revolt and threatening to take themselves in independent direc-
tions.29
Dealing with these problems would require outlays of U.S. tax dollars that might
dwarf the cost of the war itself and impede domestic recovery.
The central goal of postwar U.S. policy became the economic and financial re-
construction of Germany as the new axis of an integrated European market for
American goods and services and a similar program for Japan in East Asia, which
would grant Japan management rights over the very empire it had just lost, but un-
der American supervision. As then U.N. ambassador John Foster Dulles put it: “a
healthy Europe” could not be “divided into small compartments.” It had to be orga-
nized into “an integrated market big enough to justify modern methods of mass
production for mass consumption.” Having challenged the United States and
Europe’s empires both Germany and Japan would now become junior partners in
“America Inc.,” sharing in the benefits of a global economy while uniting to thwart
the opposition of communists and economic nationalists. 30
Just as the key to the American victory in World War II had depended upon allied
access to the fuel upon which all industrial and military production and deployment
had depended, so postwar policy increasingly focused upon control of oil. As the
State Department’s Petroleum Division put matters even before the war ended, oil
was “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes
in world history.”31
The following year, State Department position papers reaffirmed this position:
Our petroleum policy is predicated on a mutual recognition of a very extensive joint
interest and upon control . . . of the great bulk of the petroleum resources of the
world. . . . US-UK agreement upon the broad, forward-looking pattern of the develop-
ment and utilization of petroleum resources under the control of nationals of the two
countries is of the highest strategic and commercial importance.32
Inclusion of Britain in this condominium was actually somewhat disingenuous
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since the British Empire was collapsing as a direct result of the war, and Washington
was playing Rome to Britain’s Athens. Indeed, American oil policy was aimed at
controlling wartime allies as well as enemies. As James Forrestal, shortly to be
named the first Secretary of Defense, put matters in 1947, “whoever sits on the
valve of Middle East oil may control the destiny of Europe.”33  The next year
George Kennan, architect of the anti-communist policy of containment and State
Department chief of policy planning, wrote that “U.S. control over Japanese oil
imports would help provide ‘veto power’ over Japan’s military and industrial poli-
cies.”34
The Truman Doctrine of 1947 purportedly sought to declare war on communism
but effectively globalized the Monroe Doctrine in support of traditional goals. An
early draft of Truman’s message read as follows:
Two great wars and an intervening world depression have weakened the (capitalist)
system almost everywhere except in the United States . . . if, by default, we permit free
enterprise to disappear in other countries of the world, the very existence of our democ-
racy will be gravely threatened.35
What Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson feared was a return to self-
contained, exclusive economic blocs that would freeze out American enterprise.
Whether that took the form of Stalinism, state socialism, economic nationalism, or
Arab nationalism made little difference. What official Washington meant by “free
enterprise” was freedom for American corporations and financial institutions to
penetrate the markets of the world on American terms. Obviously that would limit,
at the very least, the freedom of others.
Fearing that such language would make the policy appear “like an investment
prospectus” the final draft of the Truman Doctrine was retro-fitted to emphasize the
global threat of communism.36
Yet the cost of reconstructing ruined economies and taking on the financial bur-
dens in Greece and Turkey from Britain were an enormous drain on the U.S. bud-
get, especially in the continuing absence, despite the Marshall Plan, of Europe’s
ability to buy from American producers.
Then, in 1949, the near simultaneous shocks of the Chinese Communist Revolu-
tion and the earlier than predicted Soviet atomic bomb success altered Washington’s
plans. Though genuine China experts emphasized the tensions between the Chinese
communists and Stalin, and insisted that China posed no threat to the United States,
and though the Soviets did not have the strategic forward bases to conduct atomic
air assaults on the United States, the Truman Administration’s response stimulated
the hysteria that was beginning to sweep the nation and wrought the utter reorienta-
tion of U.S. foreign policy. Militarization, unprecedented in American history,
became the order of the day.37
The Soviet A-Bomb was predictable. Considerable evidence exists to conclude
that one of the major factors in the decision to use the Bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki had as much to do with sending a clear message to Stalin as to the Japa-
nese. Stalin was shocked by the atomic bombings. He now had at hand prima facie
evidence that the Americans could be as ruthless as himself. Certainly, the Soviets
drew a clear conclusion from the vaporization of the two cities, and they then pulled
out all the stops in their own scientific establishment to meet the United States on its
own nuclear terms.38
Ironically, in the name of meeting what it claimed was a deadly threat,
Washington’s policies toward the Soviets induced them to create the far graver threat
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of being able to wreak nuclear annihilation upon the United States, a threat which
nearly came to reality on more than one occasion, and which still exists in the form
of Russia’s formidable nuclear arsenal.
While liberals and conservatives blamed China’s march to communism on
Moscow, the reality was that the corrupt rule of Washington’s client, Jiang Jieshi
(then called Chiang Kai-shek) provided the vacuum which Mao Zedong readily
filled. The communists had resisted the Japanese fiercely while Jiang’s troops con-
fined their military activities to plundering their fellow Chinese. Communists rode
to power in China on the crest of popular support, and as a result of Chinese condi-
tions, not because puppet-masters in the U.S.S.R. orchestrated events.39 The sudden
withdrawal of all of northeast Asia from the global capitalist system seriously de-
ranged Washington’s reconstruction plans for Japan, which required access to the
region’s resources and markets, just as it did before World War II.
There was fear that renewed government subsidies of military industries would
siphon capital away from research and investment in the civilian sector, but advo-
cates of the new emphasis won support by appealing to the public anxiety already
created by the “Communist threat.”
Thus the newly created National Security Council soon issued one of the most
pivotal documents in the annals of U.S. foreign policy: National Security Memoran-
dum No. 68 (NSC 68). Arguing that a quantum leap in military spending might
distort the Soviet-bloc economies to the point where they would develop military
hardware over consumer goods, “guns over butter,” and thereby foster internal
upheaval, NSC 68 called for a tripling of the U.S. military budget, accompanied by
parallel tax increases, the reining in of labor, reduction of social welfare spending,
and greater propaganda measures domestically to build public consensus for a heated
up Cold War.4-
There was, however, one significant problem. The fiscally conservative Congress
balked at the enormity of the appropriations requested. Two months later relief
arrived. In the deathless words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, “Thank God!
Korea came along and saved us.”41
Korea had been divided by agreement between Washington and Moscow at the
end of World War II, with plans for reunification to be decided in future. As was the
case in China, matters were complicated by the fact that indigenous Korean opposi-
tion to Japanese rule had been led by the communists. Thus communists believed
they had a right to establish the postwar government. Anticommunists, led by the
American client Syngman Rhee were equally determined to reunify Korea on their
terms, and until the war began had to be restrained by Washington from attacking
the north.
Only weeks before the war began, Secretary Acheson had written Korea out of
the United States “defense perimeter,” but now the North Korean “invasion” of their
own country was touted as evidence of the growing Soviet-led communist menace to
the free world. Washington declared it and organized the UN “coalition” to drive the
northerners out of the south, but once that had been achieved General Douglas
MacArthur went beyond his mandate, crossed into the north, and indicated his inten-
tion to drive the communists from power altogether. This had the inevitable effect
of drawing China into the war, and the world stood at the brink of another global
conflagration. When, in 1953, an armistice was signed, over 3 million Koreans were
dead, more than 50,000 U.S. soldiers had been killed, and the political boundaries
of the nation were exactly what they had been when the war began. But South Korea
was now safe for massive American foreign investment.42
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Similar patterns of communist and nationalist resistance to the U.S. agenda
appeared throughout what the west liked to call the Third World. Ho Chi Minh
turned toward communism as a direct result of having lived under French capital-
ism, as predatory and parasitic a system as any “ism,” and because, when he looked
to American aid at the Versailles peace conference in 1919, he was shown the door,
as he would be in 1946 when he appealed to President Truman for recognition of
Vietnamese independence. Moreover, the Vietnamese revolution was impelled prima-
rily by nationalism not communism.43 Throughout the former European empires, the
real problem for Washington was de-colonization. Sometimes the movements were
communist but often not. Nationalism and the movement toward “non-alignment”
were equal threats, though anti-communism provided the ideological cover for
Washington’s global military response to any and all emerging movements that
might frustrate the overall goal of a unitary, integrated, American-managed world-
system.
Thus, in the name of anticommunism, the newly minted Central Intelligence
Agency, violating the congressional mandate that had created it and domestic and
international law as well, overthrew the parliamentary government in Iran in 1953
and Guatemala in 1954. In that year, Vietnam was divided, supposedly temporarily,
in order to allow nationwide elections, but, since the CIA knew that Ho Chi Minh
would easily win, the division was really to buy time to prevent Ho from achieving
his movement’s goal of independence and national unity. In fact, Washington moved
to prevent national elections and invented a new state, South Vietnam, and pretended
that it was the choice of a majority of Vietnamese.44
Throughout the 1950s the United States also intervened covertly to thwart the rise
of Arab and Muslim nationalism, particularly Nasserism, a strategy that backfired by
inadvertently promoting Islamic fundamentalism.
 In 1961, the CIA worked to overthrow the popularly elected government of
Patrice Lumumba in the Congo; attempted the overthrow of Castro in Cuba in the
same year, which pushed him even closer to the Soviets and led to the nearly apoca-
lyptic missile crisis in 1962; overthrew in 1963 the government of Ngo Dinh Diem,
which it had originally installed; aided the military overthrow of an elected govern-
ment in Brazil in 1964; succeeded in overthrowing Sukarno in Indonesia in 1965;
and invaded Vietnam in March and the Dominican Republic in April of that year;
assisted in the right-wing overthrow of the constitutional government of Greece in
1967; and aided generals in Chile, only one of two democracies in Latin America, to
overthrow the legitimately elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973.45
Despite efforts in the mid-1970s by Congress to rein in such activities on the part
of American intelligence agencies, this pattern continued in Africa and in Central
America during the 1980s, and on up to the present day, a full decade after the fall
of communism. New enemies appeared as soon as the old ones departed.
The origin of the current crises in Afghanistan and Iraq can be traced back to
European imperial adventures in these countries, and particularly the division of the
former Turkish empire by Britain and France after World War I, but once the United
States displaced the old empires it, too, turned to intervention throughout the Arab
and Muslim world.
Forgotten today is the fact that the very first profits American oil companies
derived from the Middle East came from Iraq.46 After World War II, as noted, Wash-
ington sought to supplant British dominance in the region and largely succeeded. In
1955, the Eisenhower Administration agreed to anchor the Bagdad Pact, an informal
alliance of the United States, Britain, and the four western-dominated nations of
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Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. In 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine made the agree-
ment formal by declaring America’s intent to arm these nations and defend the re-
gion against “outside agression.” The United States was responding to the
rising tide of Arab nationalism and efforts by Arab regimes to throw off western
dominance by seeking closer relations with the Soviet Union.
In 1958 the British-sponsored Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by a military coup
comprised of nationalist and Pan-Arab officers led by General Abdul Karim Qassim,
who announced his intention to nationalize Iraqi oil, establishing relations with the
Soviets, and set in motion an informal coalition of states that would ultimately
become the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC. At that time,
Allen Dulles, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, cited the situation in Iraq as
“the most dangerous in the world today.”47
The CIA then began to cultivate relations with the Iraqi Ba’ath party, known to
be violently opposed to Qassim. Saddam Hussein, then a youthful Ba’athist,
attempted to assassinate Qassim. Thus, the CIA was instrumental in assisting Hussein
in his rise to power through the ranks of the Ba’ath until he became president of
Iraq in 1979 when his first action was to murder all of his presumed opponents.48
While Islamic fundamentalism in its present form came into existence as a protest
against European meddling and westernization, it received a mighty boost when the
United States re-installed the hated Shah in Iran by overthrowing the parliamentary
government of Premier Mossadegh. The Shah’s regime suppressed traditional Shiite
Islam brutally with a secret police force trained by the CIA and promoted western
style modernization. It even went so far, in the mid-1970s, as to allow the army to
fire on Shiite women demonstrating to wear the banned chador, or Islamic head-
dress, killing dozens and thereby setting off the firestorm that ultimately led to the
Islamic Revolution.49
To contain the spread of Shiite fundamentalism, Washington found it expedient to
curry favor with Saddam Hussein of neighboring Iraq (whom it had assisted to
power in the first place), encouraging him to go to war with Iran, and providing
him with much military hardware and other forms of support. Donald Rumsfeld,
then President Reagan’s special envoy, even met with the dictator in 1983 and gave
him a warm handshake and the go-ahead.50 When Saddam used chemicals provided
him by American companies to make poison gas and then used it on Iranians and
Kurds within Iraq itself, the international community condemned this savage crime.
But the first Bush administration refused to join in and worked to protect his
regime right up until he crossed his erstwhile patron by invading Kuwait.51
Propaganda was employed to win the American public’s support for war with
Iraq in 1990, including the impersonation of a Kuwaiti nurse by the Kuwaiti foreign
secretary’s daughter, who claimed to have seen Iraqi troops slaughtering infants
when she hadn’t even been in Kuwait during the invasion. This grotesque and men-
dacious publicity stunt was orchestrated by the public relations firm Hill and
Knowlton, with deep connections to the current administration. It is telling that
when Iraqi troops committed genuine atrocities in Iran and against Iraqi Kurds,
these received virtually no notice in the American press, at least not until later after
Saddam had been demonized.
At any rate, the first Gulf War was no contest, and Iraq was driven from Kuwait
easily. Rather than overthrow Saddam at that time, the first Bush administration
realized that the untimely removal of Saddam would quickly lead to the disintegra-
tion of Iraq and quite likely to a Shiite takeover of much of the nation, while the
Kurds would opt for independence, thereby inflaming Turkey’s, Iran’s, and Syria’s
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Kurds. In other words the entire Middle East would have been further destabilized.
The Bush administration would have preferred Saddamism without Saddam, but
in the absence of a strongman it could trust, it settled for the devil it knew — one
whose brutality could be counted upon to keep Iraq intact. The result was twelve
more years of Saddam for Iraq.
When a United Nations team visited Iraq immediately following the war it found
its infrastructure, including water systems, sewage systems, electricity grids, and
hospitals in an “apocalyptic condition”— this was devastation induced by the
American bombing.52 Once one of the more developed of Third World nations, Iraq
collapsed suddenly into one of the poorest. Recently discovered Defense Intelligence
Agency documents show that U.S. military planners knew clearly that the destruc-
tion of Iraq’s civilian infrastructure would lead inexorably to mass epidemics of
extremely serious diseases and that the absence of an Iraqi capability to treat them
would lead to widespread death and suffering. The conclusion is inescapable. Wash-
ington wanted mass civilian deaths and casualties. 53
Beyond that, in short order Washington imposed a comprehensive sanctions
regime that over the next few years, led to the deaths of over 500,000 Iraqi children
under the age of five. The Clinton administration, in a bid to undermine criticism,
appeared to soften the sanctions through the “oil for food” program. But it was
utterly predictable that Saddam would sabotage it by keeping oil revenues to reward
his closest allies and allowing ordinary Iraqis quite literally to starve. Even the UN
itself, ostensibly the initiator of the sanctions, released reports indicating that the
effects on the Iraqi people contravened the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention.
The toll on ordinary Iraqis was so terrible, the UN estimated 1.7 million Iraqi civil-
ian deaths as a result of sanctions, that the former Assistant Secretary General of the
UN, Dennis Halliday, and many other top officials, resigned in protest saying:“the
policy of economic sanctions is totally bankrupt. We are in the process of destroying
an entire society. It is as simple and as terrifying as that.”54
 In 1999, seventy members of Congress appealed to President Clinton to lift the
sanctions and end what they termed “infanticide masquerading as policy.”55 Later,
when asked about the deaths of so many Iraqi children, Clinton’s Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, declared on American national television that she thought it
“worth the price” and earned the bitterness of much of the Islamic world.56
Even before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter
declared that the Soviets were threatening the entire region, and he therefore enunci-
ated his own version of American foreign policy doctrince by asserting “Any attempt
by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as
an assault on the vital interests of the United States and such an assault will be re-
pelled by any means mecessary, including military force.”57
The CIA had been working with the Pakistani Interservices Intelligence Agency
(ISI) to recruit approximately 50,000 Islamic mujahideen (including Osama bin
Laden) from across the Muslim world to enter that nation to undermine its pro-
Soviet regime. These Islamists committed acts of terror against civilians, including
blowing up buildings and aircraft in Afghanistan and in neighboring Soviet repub-
lics. No American officials called them terrorists then. Instead they applied the
Orwellian appellation “freedom fighters.”
President Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, put matters
baldly: “We didn’t push the Russians to intervene but we knowingly increased the
probability that they would.” On the day the Soviet Army entered Afghanistan
Brzezinski exulted: “Now we can give the U.S.S.R. its Vietnam War.”58
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Later, when it became apparent that the mujahideen had turned against their
American benefactors, Brzezinski was asked whether he regretted having brought
anti-American terrorists into existence. His answer was stark: “What is most impor-
tant to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire?
Some stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold
War?”59 Stirred-up Muslims indeed! The Taliban soon after gave safe haven to bin
Laden and he then used Afghanistan as a base to launch terrorist attacks against U.S.
targets, most particularly the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September
11, 2001.
There is considerable evidence that plans to attack both Afghanistan and Iraq had
been formulated in the Bush White House prior to the events of 9/11. Just nine days
after 9/11, key members of the Defense Policy Board, many of whom had served in
the Bush I administration, wrote an open letter to George W. Bush arguing:
Even if evidence does not directly link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at
the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute
an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.60
Well before Bush was even “elected” a radical plan to exert global hegemony had
been put forth by a group calling itself the Project for a New American Century
(PNAC), the main elements of which have been put into motion, and which consti-
tute the most comprehensive revision of American foreign policy since NSC-68.
PNAC resembles nothing so much as the aggressive posture undertaken by Washing-
ton at the turn of the last century. Indeed, the Bush administration’s current objec-
tives far surpass the Cold War blueprint in scope and the national resources that will
be necessary to secure them.
According to PNAC, the primary goal of U.S. policy must be to prevent the rise
of any power that could challenge U.S. supremacy. That includes the economic and
military potential of the European Union as well as the former communist giants.
PNAC’s military goals stress the ability of the United States to act alone and to con-
duct “preemptive” attacks on various “enemies,” without recourse to the UN. These
are the essential tenets of the so-called “Bush Doctrine.”
In 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, objected to
the outcome of the first Gulf War, wherein Saddam Hussein was allowed to remain
in power. Wolfowitz drafted a defense policy guidance document calling for contin-
ued intervention throughout the region to “access vital raw materials, especially
Persian Gulf oil.” Rejected by the first Bush administration as too “radical,” the
document nevertheless became the template for PNAC.
In 1998, eighteen prominent neoconservatives, including Wolfowitz, Richard
Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton, James Woolsey, and Richard Perle wrote
President Clinton calling for the immediate removal of Saddam Hussein and the
implementation of much of Wolfowitz’s original plan. Again this proposal was
rejected.
But upon George W. Bush’s ascension to the presidency, most among this neo-
conservative coterie became prominent members or advisers of his administration.
In 2000, PNAC published its comprehensive blueprint for the radical revision of
U.S. policy and strategy toward the larger world, and the total reorganization of
U.S. armed forces, effectively rejecting multilateral cooperation in favor of what
amounted to a call for unilateral global hegemony by the world’s only superpower.
The proposal called for entirely new missions for U.S. forces, including a
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dominant nuclear capability and new types of nuclear weapons, sufficient combat
forces to fight and win multiple major wars at once, and “constabulary” forces to
supplant the United Nations. The plan also foresaw “a network of ‘deployment
bases’ or ‘forward operating bases’ to increase the reach of current and future
forces.” The report itself complained that the process of accomplishing this transfor-
mation was “likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event
— like a new Pearl Harbor.”61
Then on September 11, 2001, that catalyzing event occurred, and within hours
members of the Bush administration were scrambling to take advantage of the
“opportunities” that the tragic attacks afforded. As National Security Adviser
Condoleeza Rice put the matter:
An earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can shift the tectonic plates of international
politics . . . the international system has been in flux since the collapse of Soviet power
 . . . this is a period not just of grave danger but of enormous opportunity . . . to create a
new balance of power that favored freedom.62
In his State of the Union address of January 2002, Bush accused Iraq of being
part of an “axis of evil,” which  included Saddam Hussein’s bitter enemy, Iran, and
North Korea and declared that the United States was ready for “preemptive action.”
Bush stated flatly that Iraq had five hundred tons of chemical weapons, including
sarin and mustard gas, 25,000 liters of anthrax, 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin,
and 30,000 prohibited warheads, many of which Saddam was prepared to give to
terrorist groups. He also asserted that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from
Niger for its proscribed nuclear weapons program.63
On February 4, 2003, the chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, announced that
there was no evidence of Iraqi mobile bioweapons labs, no other WMD production,
and no evidence of links to Al Qaeda. The very next day, in a dramatic speech to the
United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell made a total of twenty-nine  claims
about Iraq’s ties to terrorists, its weapons programs, various violations of UN re-
quirements, and the claim that Saddam had “the wherewithal to develop smallpox.”64
The following month the United States launched all-out war on Iraq. Since then,
not a single claim made by the Bush Administration has been substantiated. On
October 2, seven months after the occupation of Iraq, CIA weapons expert David
Kay told congressional intelligence committees that “We have not yet found stocks
of weapons,” and as of this writing none have been found.65
In December 2003, a six hundred-page joint report issued by both congressional
intelligence committees on the intelligence failures in the wake of the events of 9/11
cited dozens of nations that had given aid or haven to Al Qaeda. Conspicuously
absent from the list was Iraq.58
The Bush administration’s claims have been false all along. Saddam’s regime,
cruel and despotic as it was, posed no threat to the United States or to its neighbors
and had no links to terrorism, though the assault on Iraq’s Muslims has now made
that nation a new recruiting ground for Al Qaeda. The crucial question remains:
what were the real reasons for this war?
White House and Pentagon strategic planning documents closely follow the
PNAC template. The real aim is to be found there. Massive re-organization of the
U.S. military, new weapons, including “bunker-buster” nukes, strategic bases in the
Middle East from which to carry out proposed operations against other nations,
especially Iran and Syria, which have been threatened in much the same way as Iraq,
and to assert firm control over the region’s oil reserves.
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Notes
As the twenty-first century opens, the United States finds itself at war in two
countries, with troops stationed in one hundred and thirty other nations. In the case
of Iraq, the early public optimism following in the wake of the rapid removal of
Saddam has given way to diminishing support for the continued occupation as a
mounting insurgency in that country continues to take the lives of American soldiers
and Iraqi civilians every day. Although the Bush administration continues to insist
that it is motivated by democratic, humanitarian, and security concerns, that seems
belied by the fact that the first places occupied and defended by U.S. troops as they
took Iraqi territory were the oil facilities and banks and not the hospitals, electric
power plants so vital to the well-being of ordinary Iraqis, and the museums contain-
ing the most ancient artifacts reflecting the history of western civilization. Recent
polls indicate that the majority of Iraqis see the American forces as occupiers and
not liberators as evidenced by the handpicked Iraqi governing council, sweetheart
multi-billion-dollar contracts that have been awarded without bid to the
administration’s closest corporate allies, and statements indicating that Iraq’s oil
resources are to be privatized and sold to the highest bidders who undoubtedly will
be mostly American.
As this article goes to press the Bush administration is under heavy criticism for
mounting American casualties and is making noises about the need to speed up the
transfer of power to Iraqis, though the United States faces the daunting problem of
preventing any of the leading factions among the majority Shiites from gaining the
greatest share. According to a CIA operative who trained the Afghan “freedom
fighters” to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, for every mujahideen killed by Soviet
troops at least a half-dozen of his family members immediately took up arms in
revenge. “Sadly this same rule probably applies in Iraq.” He added:
There were two stark lessons in the history of the twentieth century. No nation that
launched a war against another sovereign nation ever won. And every nationalist-based
insurgency against a foreign occupation ultimately succeeded. 67
Troop morale among U.S. forces is declining, enlistments and re-enlistments
among all troops but especially Reserves and National Guard units are rapidly drop-
ping, and Bush is quietly filling draft-board positions across the country. If the most
influential voices within the administration are to be taken seriously, the president’s
re-election and four more years of power are likely to result in the expansion of
what they like to call the “war on terror” but  is, in fact, a great deal more than that,
the consequences of which cannot yet be predicted but are certain to be tragic. z
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